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This article investigates the issue of commitment by a durable goods monopolist. Two models of 
the interaction between durability, recycling, and market power are compared. The two differ 
according to the ability ?f the seller to credibly commit to a given salec qtrn+egy. This article 
takes the standard durable goods monopoly model, extends it to allow for depreciation, and 
compares the monopoly markup with Swan’s predicted markup for a recycled good. The 
difference between the two models is shown to reduce to a single parameter in the markup 
equation. 
1. Introduction 
The existing literature on the relationship between durability, recycling, 
and market power has taken two distinct approaches. Coase (1972), Stokey 
(1981) and Bulow (1982) model a durable goods monopoly seller who cc nnot 
commit to a given sales strategy. Their emphasis has been on character zing 
the equilibrium price path through time. Swan (1980) focuses instead (1 the 
effect of secondhand markets on monopoly rents.’ His model allow for 
commitment and the analysis is restricted to the steady state. 
This article brings these two approaches together in a simple way. Fir;:, I 
extend Bulow’s two-period discrete-time model to a finite period model that 
allows for depreciation.” A steady state can then be derived, restricting the 
difference between the two models to the commitment assumption. The 
results show that the notion of commitment (or lack of cdmmitment) czn be 
*This paper is adapted from my Ph.D. dissertation. I am indebted to Tim Bresnahan for 
detsiled comments on previous drafts of the paper. I retain responsibility for all errors. 
‘See also Sipper and Swan (1973), Caskins (1974) and Schmalensee ( 1974). 
2This paper is based on my thesis, Suslow (1984). In a recent article, Bond and Samuelson 
(i984) extend Stokey’s (1981) model to allow for depreciation and CapdCity constraints. They 
focus on the stock of ?he good with replacement sales allowed, and how this stock re!ates to the 
competitive level. My model, which also allows for depreciation, yields -‘cry r,imilar results. I 
therefore take R.z $_.:ez t’l+ I.-.-:- ~I,. -I--:“~’ ?-A ,.fll -r* r> r’r”.- +I.-m ..r:*L-n tha teat nf the 
paper. 
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parzmeterized in a straightforward mar,ner. The paper concludes by showing 
how the monopoly markup formulas implied by the two approaches differ in 
an empirically testable way. 
2. Durable goods monopoly with depreciation 
According to conventional analysis, a producer who rents a durable good 
will maximize profits by setting marginal revenue from the stock demand 
curve equal to marginal cost. Each period the static monopoly quantity is 
rented at the static monopoly rental price. Can a seller achieve this level of 
profits? Yes, if it can commit to producing only the monopoly quantity in 
the Crs: period and zero units thereafter. Consumers are charged a sales price 
the first period that reflects the present discounted value of the stream of 
equilibrium prices set by the renter. This price will clear the market. Perfect 
foresight guarantees that consumers are willing to pay a sales price today 
that represents the present discounted value of all future service flow values 
(rentai prices) of the durable good. 
If the monopolist has no means of credibly commiting to a predetermined 
production path an incentives problem arises. Reducing the price in order to 
increase sales imposes a capital loss not on the seller, but on its previous 
customers. The fact that this capital loss is not internalized creates an 
incentive rio contmue selling as long as positive incremental profits can be 
made. If buyers are aware of this incentive, the firm cannot credibly commit 
to a strategy which professes to restrict output. 
The key to solving the muiti-period problem in the non-commitment case 
lies in enforcing the constraint imposed by a perfect equilibrium, which calls 
for Jrategies that are optimal at any point in time. In the second to last 
period the consumers can calculate the profit maximizing strategy of the 
monopolist, given the total outstanding stock. Thus, they can formulate a 
rule for the final, period T price as a function of the penultimate period price 
(since there are no commitment issues in period T). This rule becomes a 
constraint to be satisfied for the monopolist maximizing profits from period 
T- 1 to period IT: By repez:ing this process, consumers can arrive at a rule 
relating price in period T- 2 ta price in T- 1, given the price rule relating 
period T- 1 to T, and so on. The monopolist lookinp at the problem from 
any time t forward is therefore faced by a set of constraints from time t + 1 to 
‘I: 
Let Q, be the end-of-period cumulative stoc’:. There is a discount factor of 
6, and a constant depreciation rate 7. Then qr= Q, -( 1 - y)Q, _ 1 defines ihc 
sales flow in period t. Also, let PR: = f(Q,) be the known rental demand 
curve. The beginning-of-period sales price, Pst, is equal to the discounted 
value of the future implicit rental prices (for that fraction of the goods that 
has not deprepiated). or 
Perfect foresight over QI and knowledge of 
consumers enforces condition (I ). 
Marginal cost is assumed to be zero 
monopolist’s objective function at any time 
nr = i s’-‘P,& 
t=t 
the demand CLAW on ths pari of 
without loss of generality. The 
r can be written as 
(2) 
Using (1) to make the transformation from Cow variables to stock variables 
yields 
[sf1-~)J*‘-9’Ro [Qf-(I-y)Q,_,-J 
Upon manipulation this reduces to 
n’= i 8-‘P&&(1 -Y)~-~+‘Q~_ J. 
t=t 
The monopolist’s problem is that of choosing a rental price at any point in 
time subject to the (perfectness) constraint that price must be set optimally in 
all future periods. The set of all such prices {Pil} constitutes rn equilibrium 
strategy. For any particular T the maximization problem is thus: 
maxIF= fj 8-TRt[Qt-(1 --y)t-~+l~_ ,I, 
P Rt t=r 
(4) 
s.t. : -4 =argmaxiT’ V k>z, 15) n 
‘Rk 
whe.:e f7’ is defined according to (3). Subject to (5), the solztiorn of the gon- 
commitment problem involves solving T one-period maximizations, starting 
frr m peric?d T and working backwards. The monopolist chooses PRr, for any 
f, knowing that PRt. for k>7 will be chosen in a similar manner when period 
k is reached.3 
II is important to emphasize that (4) is ihe seller’s objective function 
‘The natural value function one might think of with cumulative stock as the state variab’le 
does not satisfy the requirements for a dynamic programming <C?Lu?ictn. The difficulty !ies in the 
fact that while current stock is a function of pas output, current sales price is a function of al! 
fut-Me rental prices which are in turn a function of_~ututc output 
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written equivalently in terms of rental price and total stock. The transform- 
ation is made to make the problem more tractable. Substituting the rational 
expectations assumption, eq. (I). into the objective function, rather than 
imposing it as an outside consuaict, allows rental price to become the 
natural choice variable. The mathematics of the multi-period model then 
becomes much more direct. 
Solving (4) for each fttture period yields a function of the general form 
The function g, relates last 
arbitrary stock last period. 
foresight) any future capital 
period’s price to this period’s price given an 
Consumers use ( gk to ‘predict’ (with perfect 
losses. In turn, this prediction determines the 
price they are willing to pay in the current period. In this manner, gk 
becomes a constraint on the monopolist’s behavior. Thus, eq. [6) describes an 
implicit price updating rule, 
The price updating rule shows that the prices set by the monopolist are 
linked through time. This link is the key to differentiating between commit- 
ment and non-commitment models. 
Using (7) one can now obtain the first-order condition for maximizing (4) 
subject to (5), 
aQt 
‘Rt ap,, -+(Qr-(1 -r)Qr- I)= 
According to (8), profits are maximized given the outstanding stock by 
incrzaaing the period t price until that point where the current residual 
marginal revenue loss [the left hand side of (8)] is equal to the discounted 
value of the residual marginal relrenue gains from having sold less stock at 
time z [the right hand side of (8)]. 
For a general demand function, Theorem 1 of the appendix shows that the 
monpolist makes positive sales in every period. The final level of the stock, 
however, is lower than if y =O. The intuition behind this result is straight- 
forward. Consumers are willing to pay a higher price today for a fixed 
amount of the durable good bccacje they ar.ticipate a smaller increase in 
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supply in later periods. The product being sold now yields its 
shor;er period of time. A portion of the firm’s monopoly 
therefore be retained. 
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services over a 
power should 
Lemma 2 of the appendix derives the properties of the price updating rule. 
Optimal prices decline at an increasing rate over time. For the case of linear 
demand, this rate of decline is bounded: g; anproaches a value of one as T 
approaches infinity, and gk = (1 -y)/2. Note that g> =( 1 - y)/2 describes the 
optimal price updating rule for a monopolist free from intertemporal 
complications on the demand side. A larger value of g’ exposes the fact that 
present and future demand are linked. 
3. Comparison of monopoly markup formulas 
The next step is to compare the steady-state markup 
monopolist under the conditions imposed by the durable 
formula for the 
goods monopoly 
model and by the simplest recycling model used in Swan (1980),’ where 
scrap is discarded by users. The methodology followed in the durable goods 
monopoly model is to maximize profits first, and then pass to the steady 
state.’ Depreciation of the stock is replaced each period in the steady state. 
This requires substituting the condition 
into the first-order condition, eq. (8). Using the fact that gi is a constant over 
t in the steady state, an expression for the implicit monopoly price in terms 
of g’ and the rental demand elasticity q is derived (see the appendix), 
Q[ I+(’ -*(yf)+o. 
Swan solves by finding an expression for steady-stzte sales and then 
maximizing profits. To derive steady state 4 multiply the relationship qt =Qt 
-(l -Y)Q,-~ by 6’ and sum, 
*I do not use a specific model of Swan’s, but compare the methodology he uses with the 
durable goods monopoly approach. However, Swan’s ‘boy scouts’ model comes very close to tile 
model used here. In this model a scrap variable is kxluded, but scrap is disc&t; ivy USCIS aA 
,scavenged by boy scouts who place a low value on their time. 
?he steady state for the monopolist who can precommit involves producing !he static 
equilibrium monopoly output in the first period and subsequently producing only to replace 
depreciation. 
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; -q--6 f ci’(l-y)Q,-(l-Y)Q_l, 
f . I t=O 
where Q_ f is t2t inI*w condition. 
Using the series summation formula, 
*q=Q-6(1 -y)Q-(1 -d)(l -y)Q-1. 
7n the steady state, 
Therefore, steady-state profits are 
an 1 
- *jJpR= l-6 (QW - 4 1 - Y)QU'R) 
But in the steady state the formula for q collapses to q=yQ, so that the first- 
order condition becomes 
YQ+ 'Rap, 178(1--6(1 -y))==O. 
This yields a final monopoly pricing formula using Swan’s approach of 
Ql ( l -s 1-W-Y) -___ =. Y lrl u * , WV 
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Comparing (9) and (10) yields the main result: the two markup exy?ressions 
are identical aside from the appearance of the price updating rule, g’. The 
absence of a link between prices over time in eq. (1Oj shows that Swan’s 
solution concept allows the firm to commit to a steady-state quantity. 
Given that g’ must be less than one, eqs. (9) and (10) imply that the value 
of the rental demand price elasticity must be greater in (10). One can infer 
from this that the level of the steady-state stock is higher without commit- 
ment. Thus, while there is only one price charged in the steady state, 
regardless of the commitment assumption, it is the threat of a decrease in 
price that causes the result in the durable goods monopoly model to differ in 
a significant way. This theoretical result opens up the possibility of empiri- 
tally distinguishing between commitment and non~commitment behavior. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In empirical oligopoly models, it is the convention to have those para- 
meters, 1, which index the oligopoly solution concept, enter an equation of 
the form MR(A)=MC6 The degree to which durability affects pricing is also 
an empirical issv 2 In the case with intertemporally complicated demand, 
marginal revenue will be a function of both current and future xales. In an 
appropriately specified model it should be possible to identify the parameter 
we have called the price updating rule. This parameter would reflect a link 
between current and future marginal revenue. From these theoretical under- 
pinnings future work will attempt to construct empirical tests of the 
commitment, issues raised in the durable goods mor;>poly literature. 
Appendix: Equilibrium properties with depreciation and derivation of 
steady-state markup 
Totally differentiate eq. (8) to find the optimal price updating rule, 
where 
rYi:+1= fi gi and mz+l = fi gi. 
k=r+ 1 k=r+l 
‘%e, for example, Bresnahan (19811, Gallop and Roberts (1979) md lwata (1974). 
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Lemma 1. gi>O. 
Pro@ Proof by induction. Assume g; > 0 for all k > r and show g: > 0. 
‘The denominator of (A.l) is negative by the second-order conditic The 
assumption g; > 0 implks rn:, 1 >O, and with downward sloping der-. ,d we 
have g: > 0. 
The induction begins by showing gk>O. From (A-l), 
g;,u -YWQT- l/mtT- 1) >O 
amT/apRT - II 
Theorem 1. In equilibrium the monopolist’s strategy satisfies qt >O. That is, 
there exists no time T such that Q1=(l -y)r-C+lQ1-l Vtzr. 
proof. If there does exist such a r then eq. (8) in the text bzomes 
which is a contradiction unless P, =O. 0 
Lemma 2. For the case of PRt =f(QJ a Zirrcar function, (1 - y)/2 sgi K 1. The 
equality g; = (1 -y)/2 holds onZy Jfnr k = T and g’: = 1 holds as T approaches 
infinity. 
ProoJ: For the linear case (A. 1) is 
g:= 
l+=$+, S’_l(l -$-‘+l h g; 
k=:+l 
2+2ff+1 ~‘-‘,_fp~~’ * 
For z = T this reduces to g’dil - y)/2). 
For c < T expand the formula 
+(...+,~-‘(l-r)r-‘+lg:,I...g;)/cr, (A-2) 
where 5 = 2 + [2&g:: I + 2S2g:2+ ,g;“+ 2 + 6 * * + 2sT-*g5 ,gT:“+ 2.. . g;-2]. One can 
show g:< 1 by subtracting the two terms in square brackets and arriving at 
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the followin?, zquation: 
ag:+ ,cg:+ IY 4 -YM 
where gi + 1 is of the form g: + 1 = x/y. 
Thus, gi< 1 is equivalent to stating 
2-(1 -r9+6g;+l(rxj>0, from (A.29 and (A.39 
-1 +y+Gyxg:+l >o, 




To find the steady-state monopoly markup substitute Qr = Qt_: 1 = * a. = Q 
into (89 and factor, 
In the steady state the price updating rule is a constant g’ for all k, so that 
or 
which is eq. (99 in the text. 
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